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Gettysburg Made Plain



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GETTYSBURG MADE PLAIN



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GETTYSBURG MADE PLAIN

*A SUCCINCT ACCOUNT OF
THE CAMPAIGN AND BATTLES, WITH THE AID OF
ONE DIAGRAM AND TWENTY-NINE MAPS*


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PREFACE.

Every intelligent American desires to learn the principal features of the campaign and battle of Gettysburg, but the complicated movements of the troops are hard to understand, and readers who have not had the advantage of a military education become weary and discouraged in the attempt to master them.

In this little treatise the whole matter is elucidated in general terms by explaining the strategic reasons for the different changes of position, leaving out the minor details which are so perplexing.

Thus treated the knowledge may be easily acquired, and will prove valuable as an introduction to the larger works on the same subject.

The maps in this volume are compilations by the author, from the official reports of the commanders on both sides, and from the maps of Colonel John B. Bachelder, which were purchased by Congress for the War Department.

A. D.

GETTYSBURG MADE PLAIN.


PRELIMINARY.

AT the beginning of the Gettysburg campaign, June 3, 1863, the Confederate Army, under command of General Robert E. Lee, was composed of three large corps under (1) Longstreet, (2) Ewell, and (3) Hill—about 70,000, including Stuart's cavalry force (11,100, and 16 guns), and batteries of artillery containing 190 guns.

The Union Army, then under command of General Joseph Hooker, was composed of seven small corps under (1) Reynolds, (2) Hancock, (3) Sickles, (5) Meade (succeeded by Sykes), (6) Sedgwick, (11) Howard, (12) Slocum—about 82,000 in all; a heavy cavalry force—about 11,000, and 27 guns—under Pleasonton, and batteries of artillery containing 300 guns.

POSITION OF THE TWO ARMIES.

LEE was on the south side of the Rappahannock at and near Fredericksburg, guarding the road to Richmond.



Hooker was opposite Lee on the north side of the river, guarding the road to Washington.

THE INVASION OF THE NORTH.

LEE determined to invade the Northern States for the following reasons:

1. As the resources of the South were giving out while those of the North seemed virtually inexhaustible, Lee wished to bring on a decisive battle as soon as possible. He was encouraged to do so by his recent success at Chancellors-

ville, by the arrival of Longstreet's corps from Suffolk, Va., and by the fact that Hooker would soon lose a large part of his army by expiration of enlistments. To draw the Union Army from its strong position among the Stafford Hills, he proposed to threaten Washington.

2. Being a long distance from his main depots Lee was very much embarrassed to keep his men supplied with a proper amount of food and he coveted the rich flocks and herds of Pennsylvania.


3. Lee saw plainly that Vicksburg was about to fall; that the Southern people would lose heart and give up the contest unless he achieved some great success in the North to counterbalance such a disaster in the West.

BEGINNING OF THE MOVEMENT.

HILL's corps was ordered to remain at Fredericksburg, and the corps of Ewell and Longstreet to join Stuart's cavalry at Culpeper.

HOOKER SUSPECTS.

HOOKER, seeing a great diminution of tents in his front, suspected that the enemy were leaving Fredericksburg. He said to Sedgwick — a life-



long friend and classmate — “John, go over there and see if the enemy have gone. They may have left merely their empty tents to deceive us.”

SEDGWICK CROSSES.

So, on the 6th of June, Sedgwick threw bridges out, under cover of his artillery, and crossed the Rappahannock. He sent back word to Hooker, “There is a pretty stiff opposition; I think their main body must be still here.”


HOOVER VERIFIES HIS SUSPICIONS.

HOOVER directed Pleasanton to take all the cavalry that could be spared and go to Culpeper, to ascertain if anything unusual was going on there. All of Stuart's cavalry and two-thirds of the Confederate Army, as we have shown above, were in that vicinity.

**BATTLE OF BRANDY STATION, JUNE 9TH.**


PLEASANTON, who was at Warrenton Junction, backed by two infantry brigades, slipped quietly down to the Rappahannock and bivouacked there without fire or light. At dawn the next morning he crossed the stream, completely surprised Stuart's cavalry and very nearly captured his artillery. Unfortunately Colonel Benjamin F. Davis, who led the advance, was killed, and there was no officer at hand to take his place. This caused some delay and confusion, which gave the enemy time to rally and form line of battle.

After fighting all day against Stuart's cavalry, the enemy's infantry came up and Pleasanton retired. He reported to Hooker that two-thirds of the enemy were at Culpeper preparing to move on Washington.



LEE'S PLANS.

IF Lee's cavalry had not been so badly cut up it is probable he would have attempted to *advance*



directly north. As it was, Lee determined to make a circuit by way of the Shenandoah valley. This left a mountain wall between him and Hooker, concealing his movements and enabling him, thereby, to gain time.

As Lee held the passes he felt safe against a flank attack.

HOOKER GUARDS THE RAPPAHANNOCK.

HOOKER sent troops up the Rappahannock to prevent Lee from crossing by the direct route.

Lee sent Ewell's corps to the Shenandoah valley with orders to clear out the Union troops under Milroy at Winchester and under Tyler at Martinsburg.

HOOKER STARTS FOR WASHINGTON.

HOOKER started toward Washington. Ewell gained possession of Winchester and Martinsburg, but not of Harper's Ferry.

LEE DESIRES THE BULL RUN RANGE OF MOUNTAINS.

THERE is a rocky and thickly wooded range of heights called the Bull Run Mountains, running from Leesburg south. As Hooker had not occupied them but was farther to the east, Lee desired to do so, for it would give him a strong position on Hooker's flank and bring him (Lee) very near to Washington. He therefore directed his cavalry to reconnoiter in that direction.



BATTLE OF ALDIE, JUNE 17TH.

STUART'S reconnoitering party met the Union cavalry at Aldie, and after a hard battle retreated.

RETREAT OF STUART'S CAVALRY.

A SERIES of cavalry combats ensued, ending in the retreat of Stuart's cavalry behind the Blue Ridge.

LEE ENTERS PENNSYLVANIA.

HOOKEr was strongly posted east of the Bull Run range and could not be attacked with much chance of success. As Lee could not well remain inactive or retreat, he resolved to invade Pennsylvania. This was a hazardous enterprise, for Hooker might intervene between him and Richmond. Stuart's cavalry was left to prevent this catastrophe by guarding the passes in the Blue Ridge. Stuart was also directed to harass Hooker and attack his rear should he attempt to cross the Potomac in pursuit of Lee.

A MILITIA REGIMENT OCCUPIES GETTYSBURG.

LEE reached Chambersburg with Longstreet's and Hill's corps. Ewell's corps was in advance at Carlisle and York, preceded by Jenkins's and by White's cavalry, threatening to cross the Susquehanna and take Harrisburg.



In the mean time Stuart's cavalry had crossed the Potomac near Seneca Creek above Washington, reached Rockville near Washington on its way north. Two of his brigades under Jones and Robertson were holding the gaps in the Blue Ridge without any enemy in front of them. Hooker's army was still at and near Frederick, Maryland.




The Pennsylvania militia were assembled at Columbia and Harrisburg; on June 26th a militia regiment occupied Gettysburg.

A CHANGE OF UNION COMMANDERS.

ON June 28th, Hooker determined to send Slocum's corps and the garrison of Harper's Ferry — the latter about 10,000 strong — to operate against Lee's rear. This was an excellent plan, but Hooker's superior, General Halleck, refused to allow him to remove the troops from Harper's Ferry; and Hooker said if he could not manage the campaign in his own way, he preferred to give up the command of the army. Halleck gladly relieved him, and Major-General George G. Meade, commander of the Fifth Corps, was assigned to the command in his place.

LEE IS STARTLED.

ON June 28th, Lee learned from a scout that the Union army was in his rear and that his communication with Richmond was seriously endangered. A great battle would of course exhaust the Confederate ammunition, and if his line to Richmond was severed, he could get no more military supplies and would ultimately have to surrender.




In this emergency he concluded to threaten Baltimore. As a preliminary measure, he directed his entire army to move on Gettysburg. This he hoped would induce Meade to concentrate in his front and leave his rear free; which was precisely what Meade did do.

As soon as Meade had assumed command, he made the same request that Hooker had done for permission to utilize the large garrison at Harper's Ferry. This was granted by General Halleck, but instead of using this force to act against Lee's rear, Meade posted seven thousand of them at Frederick, Md., and sent the rest to Washington.


Under the impression that Lee's army was spread out along the Susquehanna from Carlisle to York, Meade threw out his own forces fan-shaped to march in that direction.

STUART'S TROUBLES.

STUART was intercepted at Hanover by Kilpatrick's division of cavalry, but managed to disengage himself from the contest and continue his journey to join Ewell at York. The latter was, however, on his way to Gettysburg, and Stuart passed almost within sight of him. Finding that



Ewell had left York, Stuart proceeded to Carlisle, hoping to find the main body there. He was again disappointed, and as he learned that a battle was going on at Gettysburg, he rode night and day to join Lee there. When he finally



reached the field in the afternoon of the 2d, his horses were in bad condition from overwork, and his men were utterly exhausted.


A glance at map 10 will show the perilous condition on June 30th of Buford's cavalry and the

First Corps under Doubleday. General Reynolds commanded the left wing of the Union army, composed of the First, Eleventh, and Third corps.

BATTLE OF THE FIRST DAY.

THE scattered position of Meade's army is apparent from map 10; the Union corps were still marching on and getting farther apart, while the enemy were concentrating. The advance of Hill's corps on the morning of July 1st struck Buford's division of Union cavalry a short distance to the west of Gettysburg, and in spite of a stout resistance forced it slowly back towards the town.

The First Corps at this time was five miles south of Gettysburg. General Reynolds went to the support of Buford with the nearest division of the First Corps—Wadsworth's—and directed that the others follow. While forming his line of battle he was killed. General Howard succeeded to the command of the field but did not issue any orders to the First Corps until the afternoon. In the mean time General Doubleday continued the contest, captured a great part of the forces that had assailed him, and cleared his immediate front of all enemies.




OBSERVATION.

BEFORE the Eleventh Corps came up the enemy could have walked right over the small force opposed to them, but owing to the absence of Stuart's cavalry they had not been kept informed as to the movements Meade was making, and fearing that the whole Union army was concentrated in their front they were overcautious.

BOTH SIDES REËNFORCED.


THERE was now a lull in the battle for about an hour. The remainder of the First Corps came up and was followed soon after by the Eleventh Corps under General Schurz. About the same time the Confederate corps of General Ewell arrived and



made a junction with that of Hill. General Howard assumed command of the Union forces.

THE BATTLE RECOMMENCES.

REPEATED attacks were now made against the First Corps by Ewell from the north and Hill from the west; but the Confederate charges were successfully repulsed. In one of these assaults the Confederate brigade of Iverson were nearly all killed, wounded, or captured. Ewell's attack also struck the Eleventh Corps on the right and front with great force. The continual arrival of fresh Confederate forces—for the whole country to the north and west was covered with troops, and Longstreet's corps was in sight—rendered fur-



ther resistance unavailing. Two small corps and Buford's cavalry could not contend with the whole Confederate army.

PERILOUS CONDITION OF THE FIRST CORPS.

MAP 14 shows the perilous condition of the First Corps at the close of the action. They were almost cut off from Cemetery Hill, which had been chosen by General Howard as the rallying point for the two corps, and had been partly occupied in advance. It was about half a mile south of Gettysburg.

whelming force, and the feeble remnants of the First and Eleventh corps were not in a condition to make a prolonged resistance. Hancock, too, was embarrassed by the fact that General Howard did not recognize his authority, but General Howard approved his dispositions. General Doubleday carried out Hancock's plans in regard to the First Corps, and the Ridge was held, by strategy. Leaving the First and Eleventh corps in the center Hancock directed Doubleday to send a force to Culp's Hill on the right, while he instructed Buford to parade up and down on the extreme left with his cavalry.

The enemy were thus led to suppose that the Union line was a long one and had been heavily reënforced. As the losses on both sides had been tremendous, probably not exceeded for the same number of troops during the war, the enemy hesitated to advance, particularly as some movements of Kilpatrick's cavalry seemed to threaten their rear. They therefore deferred action until Meade concentrated the next day.

On General Hancock's recommendation General Meade ordered his entire army to Gettysburg.

By dusk part of the Third Corps had arrived, and soon after the Twelfth Corps and the Second Corps were close at hand.






NOTE. — Buford and Geary of Meade's army came up after Buford and Wadsworth had been placed in position by Hancock, to protect the flanks. Edward Johnson's Confederate division (upper right-hand corner) did not reach the position assigned them on this map until after sunset or about dusk of July 1st.

BATTLE OF THE SECOND DAY.

THE following diagram will explain the advantages and disadvantages of the battle-field.



The Union army was sheltered by the curved ridge. If it was desired to reënforce any part, it could be done by short lines—chords of the arc—and its movements being behind the ridge would be hidden from the view of its enemies.

As the Confederate army acted on the offensive it had to descend into the plain where all its important operations were in full view of the Union signal stations on the heights, where were officers with powerful glasses. To reinforce any part of the Confederate line required a long march around, on the circumference of the circle, which consumed much valuable time.


On the other hand the nature of the ground made the fire from the Union batteries diffusive, while the Confederate batteries were able to concentrate a heavy fire upon almost any point in front of them.

THE UNION ARMY REACHES GETTYSBURG.

MOST of the troops, though worn out with hard marching, arrived by midday of July 2d. The Sixth Corps had thirty-four miles to march, and came later in the afternoon.

SICKLES MOVES IN ADVANCE.

IN the preceding diagram, A marks the position to which Sickles had been assigned with the Third Corps. As the ridge disappears there for a considerable space, the ground is low and, in the opinion of General Sickles, was unfavorable for





defense. He therefore went out about three-quarters of a mile to some high ground in front (marked B on the diagram). General Meade, who visited the position, disapproved this movement.

BATTLE OF THE PEACH ORCHARD.

SICKLES was soon fiercely assailed by Longstreet's corps, and although he was reënforced by two divisions of Sykes's corps (the Fifth), and by Caldwell's division of the Second Corps, all were forced back behind the main line, after very heavy fighting and severe losses on both sides. Longstreet followed up the pursuit, but the firm front of the Sixth Corps, which had now formed in line, and a brilliant charge by the Pennsylvania Reserves discouraged him from making any further attempts.

WARREN AND LITTLE ROUND TOP.

GENERAL WARREN, who was on General Meade's staff, was sent on his own suggestion to Little Round Top to see how the battle was going. He saw the enemy advancing to seize the peak he was on, and knew if they did so they would flank General Meade's position and render it untenable


by their artillery fire. He rode down at full speed and succeeded in bringing back reinforcements in time to save the position, which was really the key of the battle-field. The struggle there, however, was very severe and cost the lives of several distinguished leaders.

GENERAL LEE'S ÉCHELON ATTACKS.

THE attack as ordered by General Lee was to begin with Longstreet on the right and be made *en échelon*. That is, as soon as Longstreet was fairly engaged, Hill's corps was to take up the fight and go in, and as soon as Hill was fairly engaged, Ewell's corps on the right was to attack. The object was to keep the whole Union line in a turmoil at once, and prevent reinforcements going from any corps not engaged to another that was fighting; but Hill did not act until Longstreet's fight was over, and Ewell did not act until Hill had been repulsed. This was not carrying out Lee's programme.

RESULT OF THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK.

WHEN Longstreet's battle with Sickles, Sykes, and Caldwell was dying away, Hill's corps pre-





ceded by R. H. Anderson's division, assailed the Second Corps in front of Webb's brigade, and the two Confederate brigades in advance — those of Wright and Wilcox — succeeded in penetrating the Union line and in gaining temporary possession of some guns. It is possible if the remainder of Hill's corps had come up promptly to their support they might have made a permanent lodgment, and thus cut the Union army in two; but no one came forward to help them, they were soon driven back by part of the First Corps under Doubleday, and by other reinforcements sent by General Hancock, who on this as on other occasions was always present wherever there was danger, or a weak spot in the line to be defended.

GENERAL MEADE WEAKENS HIS RIGHT.

GENERAL MEADE was so startled by the fact that his center had been pierced, that he took away nearly all the troops and batteries that held the extreme right — Slocum's corps — and led them in person against the enemy.

THE NEXT ÉCHELON ATTACKS HOWARD.

As the thunder of the guns repelling Hill's attack died away, two brigades of Early's division

of Ewell's corps made a desperate assault against the Eleventh Corps under Howard on Cemetery Hill and captured several batteries but were driven back, with the help of Carroll's brigade of the Second Corps, which Hancock had sent to aid Howard to repel the attack.

ATTACK ON CULP'S HILL.

FINALLY the last *echelon*, General Edward Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, assailed the extreme right of the Union line at and south of Culp's Hill.

General Meade, as has been already stated, had taken away the Twelfth Corps troops and batteries from that part of the line with the exception of one small brigade under General Greene. Greene, backed by what remained of Wadsworth's division of the First Corps, firmly held the line previously assigned to Geary's division, but could not prevent the enemy from occupying the vacant intrenchments south of the hill which had been recently used by Ruger's division of the Twelfth Corps.

GENERAL RESULT OF THE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE.

THE enemy had so far failed in every attack against Meade's main line, with the exception of

that portion south of Culp's Hill. Elated by the fact that he had made a lodgment there, Ewell determined to hold on at all hazards and sent heavy reënforcements during the night to aid Johnson to make an attack in the morning.

Johnson's position was one of serious import to the Union army, for it was near the reserve artillery, and not far from Meade's headquarters, but it was 9 P. M. when he took possession of the intrenchments; the night was dark, he did not know exactly where he was and he preferred to wait until morning before making an advance.

Upon the return of Slocum's corps to their former position at Culp's Hill, they were amazed to find Johnson in possession. They also waited till daylight before making an attempt to dispossess him.

So ended the battle of the second day.

THE BATTLE OF THE THIRD DAY.

At day-dawn General Warren, acting for General Meade, established a cordon of troops and batteries which drove Johnson out of his position on the right. The enemy fell back a short distance but still menaced the force at Culp's Hill.


LEE'S PERPLEXITY.

LEE having failed in his attacks both on Meade's left and right had to decide at once whether he would give up the contest and retreat, or make another attempt to force the Union line.

LEE DETERMINES TO TRY AGAIN.

As he had been reënforced by Stuart's cavalry and as a fresh division under Pickett was available, he determined to try to pierce the left center of the Union Army and disperse the force opposed to him.

To this end he directed Longstreet to form a strong column of attack to be composed of Pickett's division and Pettigrew's division and two brigades of Pender's division, under Trimble, of Hill's corps. To create confusion and prevent General Meade from sending reënforcements to the menaced point, Stuart was ordered to ride around the right of the Union Army and make an attack in rear. And still more to facilitate the attack 135 guns were to concentrate their fire against the Union center and disperse the forces assembled there.



THE ARTILLERY OPENS FIRE.

ABOUT 1 P. M. the terrific cannonade began and lasted for two hours, by which time the Confederate ammunition was nearly exhausted. This fire disabled several of the Union batteries that were opposed to it and killed or wounded many of the cannoneers.

Eleven caissons were blown up, and as the dense column of smoke from each rose high in air the enemy's yells of exultation resounded for miles along their line.

RESULT OF STUART'S CAVALRY ATTACK.

STUART'S cavalry attack proved abortive for it was met and frustrated by two brigades of Gregg's cavalry aided by Custer's brigade after a severe battle, which was hotly contested on both sides. Stuart's further progress was checked and he was forced to retreat.

KILPATRICK'S ACTION ON THE LEFT.

KILPATRICK with two brigades of cavalry charged the right of the enemy's line west of Round Top (see map, page 51), to prevent Longstreet from weakening his right to aid Pickett.

CHARGE OF PICKETT, PETTIGREW AND TRIMBLE.

PICKETT formed his great column of attack and came forward as soon as the fire from the Union batteries slackened.

General Hunt, General Meade's chief of artillery, had withdrawn the batteries which had suffered the most, and sent fresh guns to take their place. The latter soon swept the ground over which Pickett moved, with fatal effect.

Hancock rode along the line and made prompt dispositions to meet the coming storm. Gibbon's division, of the Second Corps, received and repelled the shock, while part of Doubleday's command, principally Stannard's Vermont brigade, struck the right flank of the main body and doubled it up in confusion so as greatly to impede its progress.

General Hancock was wounded by the side of Stannard.

Wilcox's and Perry's brigades which should have guarded Pickett's right flank became separated from it and attacked the First Corps commanded since the night of the first day by General Newton. Stannard turned about and took this second column in flank, drove it back and again captured a large number of prisoners.





Still Pickett's main column pressed on in spite of all obstacles and the harvest of death it was reaping, and its advance under Armistead took temporary possession of one of the guns on the Ridge, but there its course was stayed.

In the hand-to-hand fight that ensued within our lines General Armistead was shot down, Pickett's left wing, which was much more exposed than the right, melted away, and as Union reënforcements were coming forward and Pickett's supports did not advance, he was soon compelled reluctantly to give the order to retreat, which indeed had already commenced.

THE ROUT OF THE CHARGING COLUMN.

THE whole plain was soon covered with fugitives but, as no pursuit was ordered, General Lee in person succeeded in rallying them and in re-forming the line of battle.







THE next day, July 4th, General Lee drew back his flanks and at evening began his retreat by two routes—the main body on the direct road to Williamsport through the mountains, the other *via* Chambersburg, the latter including the immense train of the wounded.

THE UNION CAVALRY IN PURSUIT.

GREGG'S division (except Huey's brigade) was sent in pursuit by way of Chambersburg but the enemy had too much the start to render the chase effective.





Kilpatrick, however, got in front of the main body on the direct route and, after a midnight battle at Monterey, fought during a terrific thunder storm, succeeded in making sad havoc of Ewell's trains.




BUFORD ATTACKS WILLIAMSPORT, JULY 6TH.


BUFORD'S division of cavalry, aided by that of Kilpatrick, came near capturing Williamsport,





defended by Imboden, with all of the Confederate trains, and the fresh ammunition so much





needed by Lee, which had been galloping from Winchester almost without an escort, to meet him.

The opportune arrival of Stuart's cavalry backed by infantry, forced Buford and Kilpatrick to fall back.

THE PURSUIT.

MEADE did not follow Lee directly but went around by way of Frederick. After considerable delay the Union Army again confronted that of Lee and were about — under orders from President Lincoln — to make an attack, when Lee slipped away on the night of July 14th to the Virginia side of the Potomac.

This ended the campaign of Gettysburg.

The Union loss was 3072 killed, 14,497 wounded, 5434 missing = Total, 23,003.

The Confederate loss was 2592 killed, 12,709 wounded, 5150 missing = Total, 20,451.

THE END.

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
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